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Summary  findings
Since its creation in 1991, the Peruvian Social Fund  live in those districts, poor households. FONCODES has
(FONCODES) has spent about US$570 million funding  had a positive effect on school attendance rates for
microprojects throughout  Peru. Many of these projecrs  young children, but not on the likelihood that childrer.
have involved building and renovating school facilities.  will be at an appropriate school level for t1  eir age.
Paxson and Schady analyze the targeting and impact of  Among other recommendations, they su,ggest  that
FONCODES investments in the education sector, using  FONCODES consider random assignment of some
data from FONCODES, Peru's 1993 population census,  education projects for a subsample of the population,  to
Peru's 1994 and 1995 Living Standards Measurement  test the robustness of the study's assumptions and results.
Surveys, and a 1996 household survey conducted by the  Lack of disaggregated data on such measlirn  s as the
Peruvian Statistical Institute.  time children spend in school, pupil-teacher ratios, anc
They present their results based on various descriptive  scholastic achievement precluded analysis of the impac:
and econometric techniques, including nonparametric  of FONCODES education projects on scho )l quality.
regressions, differences-in-diff'erences,  and instrumental  Collecting such data, and undlerstanding how
variables estimators.  improvements in school infrastructure  inte:ract  with
They show that FONCODEiS  projects in the education  other school-level changes to produce more learning,
sector have reached poor districts and, to the extent  they  should be a research priority.
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also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/r-esearch/workingpapers. November 1999.  (34 page!;)
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11.  Introduction
Since the creation of the Emergency Social Fund (ESF) in Bolivia in late 1986, social
funds have been established in dozens of countries, often with support from multilateral
organizations and international donors.  Social funds like the ESF were originally put in place to
mitigate the social costs of structural adjustment programs (for example, Newman, Jorgensen and
Pradhan, 1991; Jorgensen, Grosh, and Schachter, 1992). Since then, they have been proposed,
amongst other things, as a safety net for the poorest poor; a means of generating employment and
transferring income; an efficient mechanism to construct small-scale infrastructure, especially in
outlying, traditionally neglected areas; and a way of building on (or generating) local social
capital by involving communities in project choice, preparation, and operation and maintenance
(for example, World Bank, 1997; IDB, 1997).
This paper analyzes the targeting and impact of investments made by one social fund-the
Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES) -between  1992 and 1998. Specifically, the paper looks at
the investments FONCODES made on education.  In so doing, the paper aims to answer two
questions.  First, who received FONCODES transfers?  This is, essentially, a question of
targeting.  FONCODES aims to transfer resources, including investments in education, to poor
areas and to poor households within those areas.  The paper evaluates the extent to which it has
been successful in doing so.  Second, did FONCODES transfers improve educational outcomes?
This is, essentially, a question about the impact of investments in school facilities on measures
such as school attendance rates, the likelihood of being at an appropriate grade level for a given
age, and the average amount of time it takes children to get to school.
There are at least two reasons to focus on expenditures made by FONCODES on
education, rather than on total FONCODES expenditures.  First, education is one of the two
biggest sectors in the FONCODES portfolio, accounting for about one-quarter of total
FONCODES expenditures made between 1992 and 1998. Moreover, as Table 1.1 shows, the
bulk of these expenditures on education was made in the first few years of FONCODES
operations, so that measurable changes in outcomes such as school attendance have had some
time to take place (although the full benefits of investments in education may not be realized for
years).  An analysis of FONCODES investments in education therefore deserves attention in its
own right.  Second, it is possible to use available data sources to construct credible outcome
measures in education; this is not easily done in other sectors, such as agriculture, transportation,
or even health. 2
2 Initial inspection  of the data on health  in the 1994  and 1997  Peru LSMS,  for example,  suggests  that infant
mortality  went up during  the period. This  seems  quite implausible  given other  changes  which  took  place in
Peru between  1994  and 1997,  and is likely  driven by the very  small  number  of reported  deaths  in both
2While this paper describes and evaluates a specific program-FONCODES-it  adds to an
ongoing debate about the relationship between educational inputs and outcomes (for a summary
see Hanushek, 1995. and the response by Kremer, 1995). There is a growing body of literature
which suggests that there are high rates of return to expenditures on school facilities in many
developing countries (for example, Harbison and Hanushek, 1992; Velez, Schiefelbein and
Valenzuela, 1994; Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994; Hanushek, 1995; Glewwe, Grosh, Jacoby, and
Lockheed, 1995; Duflo, 1998). Our results suggest that expenditures on educational
infrastructure in Peru had an impact on some educational outcomes-such  as the attendan  ze rate
of young children-but  not on others-such  as the likelihood that these children would be at an
appropriate grade for their age.  Because expenditures made by FONCODES on education were
well targeted towards poor districts and (less clearly) poor households, improvements in
attendance rates were concentrated amongst the most needy.
We believe that this paper also makes a contribution to the evaluation literature.  WN'e  lase
the geographic variation in FONCODES expenditures to estimate the impact of FONCODES
investments in school facilities on educational outcomes.  Identification strategies based on
geographic differences are often used to estimate the impact of social programs and policies in
the United States (for example, Card, 1990, 1992, and 1993; Card and Krueger, 1994 and 1998)
and, more recently, in a developing country context (for example, Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons,
1993; Angrist and Lavy, 1997; Duflo; Case and Deaton, 1999). Such estimation strategies are
themselves not uncontroversial, however (for example, Besley and Case, 1994; Heckman, Farrar
and Todd, 1996).  In this paper we contrast results based on a number of estimation stratei;ies,
including "naive" regressions, "differences--in-differences",  and instrumental variables to t ,st the
robustness of our findings, and the assumptions on which these and similar results are basc  d.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we provide a brief overviev  of the
Peruvian context, andl  FONCODES.  Section 3 describes the data set.  Section 4 briefly disau.sses
previous evaluations of FONCODES.  Sections 5 and 6 present our results on the targeting and
impact of FONCODES investments in education.  Section 7 concludes.
surveys. Chronic  malnutrition  could be a more  promising  health  outcome,  since  it affected 30%  of children
under five in 1994,  and 23.8% in 1997  (World  Bank,  1999,  p. 10). However,  there appears  to be no cle  ar
relationship  between  changes  in chronic  malnutrition  and FONCODES  expenditures  on health,  water  and
sanitation.
32.  The setting
Peru has made substantial economic progress since the election of President Alberto
Fujimori in 1990. After a brief recession that followed the adoption of stringent stabilization and
adjustment measures in 1990, growth has been strong, inflation low, and poverty reduction
sustained (World Bank, 1995 and 1999). Investments in the social sectors have increased
dramatically.  The Government of Peru has attempted to target these social investments to the
poor-albeit,  with only partial success (World Bank, 1999).
FONCODES was created in 1991. The stated objectives of FONCODES were to generate
employment, help alleviate poverty, and improve access to social services (World Bank, 1998).
Between 1992 and 1998, FONCODES funded almost 32,000 community-based projects, for an
aggregate outlay of about 760 million soles. 3 As Table 1.1 shows, most community based
projects in the education sector have entailed the construction and renovation of classrooms.
Before 1995, however, FONCODES also had education projects to construct and renovate sports
facilities, and provide textbooks and other educational material to students.  In addition,
FONCODES executed a series of centrally-designed "special" projects.  Special projects in the
education sector have included a school breakfast program, and the distribution of uniforms for
schoolchildren.  Between 1992 and 1996, FONCODES spent about 160 million soles on all
special projects, including those in the education sector.
FONCODES has much in common with other social funds in the region (Glaessner et. al.
1994). Two features of FONCODES that are particularly important for this study are the
demand-driven and targeted nature of FONCODES projects.  FONCODES is demand-driven in
that communities themselves choose a project from a menu and prepare a proposal for funding.
FONCODES then functions as a financial intermediary: rather than execute projects itself, it
approves proposals and releases funds to the nucleo ejecutor--a group of community members
elected specifically for this purpose.  FONCODES also targets its investments-first,  by using an
index of "unmet basic needs" to assign resources to small geographic areas, and then conducting
an informal on-site assessment of the "poverty" of the community requesting a project.
FONCODES makes no attempt to target individual households within a given community.
3All  reported  expenditures  are in 1992  soles,  unless  otherwise  noted. The  December  1992  exchange  rate
was 1.63  soles  to the US dollar.
4 The World  Bank and the Inter-American  Development  Bank have  both supported  FONCODES  since
early 1994  with  two subsequent  loans,  for US $ 100  and 150  million  each,  for a total of US $ 500 million.
The community-based  projects  are eligible  for funding  under  the World  Bank  and IDB loans,  whereas  the
special  projects  are not,
43.  The data set
This study evaluates the targeting and impact of FONCODES investments using available
sources of data; no new data were collected.  The data for the analysis come from two main
sources: (i) information on the geographic distribution of FONCODES allocations and
expenditures, kept by FONCODES itself; and (ii) information from the 1994 and 1997 Peru
Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), and a household survey conducted by the
Peruvian Statistical Institute (INEI) in 1996.
Since 1992, FONCODES has used an "allocation rule" to direct resources to small
geographic jurisdictions-provinces,  for 1992 through 1995, and districts since 1996.
Specifically, the population of each province or district is weighted by an index of unmet tbasic
needs.  This index is an ad hoc composite of various measures-including  access to school 'n,
electricity, water, sanitation, adequate housing, and measures of chronic malnutrition and
illiteracy (Schady, 1998). Provinces or districts with higher values of the FONCODES index
have more unmet bas,ic  needs.  The index used by FONCODES has evolved over the years: until
1993, it was based on information from the 1981 population census, but it has been updatedv  with
information from the 1993 population census since 1994. The variables and weights in the index
also changed somewhat between 1992 and 1995, but have remained constant since then.
Infornation  on the FONCODES index, the allocation rule, and the corresponding allocatio ris is
available for 1992 through 1998.
FONCODES also keeps monthly records on the number of projects and aggregate amo-unts
spent in each district.  Three points are worth noting about these data.  First, because expenillures
are recorded in the month in which a project is approved, there is a lag of about two weeks iefore
disbursement of the first installment of funds, and of several months before the second (anct  final)
disbursement.  Second, only expenditures on projects are included, and not, for example,
administrative costs or expenses for general overhead. Third, district-level information on  f:ie
allocations and expenditures is only available for the community-based projects, and not for the
special projects.  Finally, we also have district-level data on the expenditures made by somn other
programs in the education sector.
The 1994 and 1997 LSMS and the 1996 INEI survey contain a wealth of information on
the expenditures or income of households, education levels, and other household characteristics.
The INEI survey has a large sample size-more  than 18,000 households, in 403 districts.  Th  e
5  Provinces  and districts  correspond  to the two levels  of local government  in Peru. In 1997,  there  we  - 194
provinces  and 1812  districts  in Peru (Webb  and Fernandez  Baca,  1997,  p. 112). The median  populatimn  of
a district  is about 4,000  people,  but there is considerable  variation  in the number  of people  per districi
some (rural)  districts  have less  than 500  people,  and other  (urban) districts  can have more  than 100,000
people.
5LSMS surveys are both smaller-about  3,500 households each, in 199 districts (in 1994) and 228
districts (in 1997)-but  they have the advantage that a very similar questionnaire was applied in
both years.  The LSMS includes a panel covering just over a quarter of the households in the two
samples.
The LSMS and INEI surveys are useful for the analysis of targeting and impact in two
ways.  All of the surveys include district-level identifiers for every household.  Household-level
information from the surveys can therefore be linked to geographic information on allocations
and expenditures kept by FONCODES.  In addition, the 1996 INEI survey includes questions
about benefits from various social programs.  Specifically, households who had at least one
member attending a public school were asked about recent improvements in school facilities, and
whether these had been carried out by (separately) FONCODES, the educational infrastructure
program INFES, or the local parents'  committee. Respondents in the 1996 INEI survey were also
asked whether any household member currently benefited from a feeding or nutrition program
carried out by one of 14 organizations, including FONCODES' school breakfast program.
We use the household surveys to construct various education outcome measures, including
school attendance rates, measures of the number of years of schooling passed for a given age, and
the average amount of time it takes children in a household to get to school, as well as household-
level covariates, such as the age, gender, ethnicity, and education of other household members.
Because these surveys were not designed specifically for an evaluation of FONCODES, however,
they also have shortcomings for our analysis. Three limitations are worth noting.  First, none of
the surveys collected information on the quality of education, including measures such as the
amount of time spent in school, pupil-teacher ratios, and scholastic achievement.  Second, there
appears to be a large amount of measurement error in the FONCODES "treatment" variable in the
1996 INEI survey. Third, questions about benefits from FONCODES programs in the 1996 INEI
survey were asked only of families with children in school.  They cannot therefore be used to
determine whether children not in school had access to a FONCODES-improved school.  We
further discuss the way in which each of these limitations affects our analysis in sections 5 and 6
below.
4.  Previous evaluations of FONCODES
Since  1994,  Apoyo,  an external  public research  NGO in Peru, has conducted  five ex-post
evaluations  of FONCODES  community-based  projects. These  evaluations  have included
interviews  with FONCODES  beneficiaries,  members  of the nucleo ejecutor, project operators,
and officials in FONCODES'  regional and central offices.  Beneficiaries and others in the sample
generally rated the impact of FONCODES investments to be positive (for a summary, see World
6Bank, 1998). In addition to the Apoyo evaluations, Moncada (1996) considers various aspects of
FONCODES performrance;  Schady compares the FONCODES index of unmet basic needs with
other district-level mesures of welfare available in Peru, and analyzes political influences on the
timing and distribution of FONCODES investments (Schady, 1998 and 1999, respectively,.
The analysis in.  this paper complements the work done by Apoyo and others.  The Apoyo
evaluations are useful to assess the opinions that FONCODES beneficiaries have of FONCODES,
but they have only lirmited  value to measure the targeting and impact of FONCODES
investments.  The evaluations did not create a rigorous control group necessary for a comparison
of FONCODES beneiaiciaries  with others; they were not based on a sampling framework which
would make it possible to apply the results from the sample to a larger population-even  if this
population were limited to FONCODES beneficiaries; and information was not gathered on a
number of important variables, including actual figures on school attendance or grade repetition.
5.  The targeting ,of  FONCODES investments in education
Social expenditures in Peru have traditionally favored vocal, urban middle-class
constituencies. FONCODES was set up, in part, to redress this balance, and funding projects
which benefited poor areas and poor households has been an important program objective from
the outset.
Targeting education resources is important in Peru because there are large difference  ; in
measures of educational attainment across regions and income groups.  We use data from tY  e
1996 INEI survey to illustrate this point.  In Figure 5.1 we graph the average number of years of
schooling attained by children of different ages who live in the poorest 25% of districts, up to
those who live in the richest 25% of districts, when districts are ordered by mean per capita
income.6 Figure 5.2 presents a comparable graph for household income quartiles.  Figures :i. 
and 5.2 clearly show that children in poor districts and poor households lag behind in the years of
schooling they attain for any given age.  The differences across quartiles increase with age,  ,o
that by age sixteen there is almost a two-year difference between children in the poorest and
richest districts, and almost a one-year difference between those in the richest and poorest iir  scome
quartiles.
A host of factors probably contribute to differences in the educational attainment of
children, including differences in the education of other household members, income,
6 INEI  combined  information  from  the 1993  population  census  and a household  survey  conducted  in I1995
to estimate  mean  district  per capita  income.  This  is done by first,  using  the household  survey  to regress
income  per capita on a set of variables  common  to the census  and the survey,  and second,  predicting  mean
income  per capita for each district  by applying  the coefficients  from the regression  to the census (see INEI,
1996,  and  Hentschel  et. al. for a discussion  of the methodology).
7employment opportunities, and ethnicity.  Many of these factors cannot be changed with public
policies-at  least not in the short run.  But educational attainment is also likely to be a function of
the number and quality of teachers, learning material, and classrooms which are available in a
community.  Poor districts and poor households may therefore need additional resources,
including resources spent on school facilities, to catch up with their better-off counterparts.  In
this section, we use nonparametric regressions to assess the extent to which FONCODES has
reached poor districts and poor households. 7
(i) Geographic targeting: Has FONCODES effectively reached poor districts?  We consider
three aspects of the geographic targeting of FONCODES investments in education: changes in
targeting over time, the sectoral composition of FONCODES expenditures, and a comparison of
district-level expenditures made by a number of programs in education, including FONCODES.
In each case, the analysis is based on actual, rather than allocated expenditures 8  Breaking down
FONCODES expenditures on education by year shows how FONCODES'  geographic targeting
has evolved over time.  Similarly, breaking down FONCODES expenditures by sector (education,
health, water and sanitation, etc.) allows us to describe the relationship between average district
welfare and project choice.  Finally, comparing district-level expenditures made by FONCODES,
INFES, and the feeding program PRONAA (which is responsible for a large school breakfast
program) places FONCODES' geographic targeting in the context of other government programs
in education.
Figure 5.3 presents a nonparametric univariate density estimate of the population living in
districts with different mean per capita incomes.  Figure 5.3 shows that most Peruvians live in
districts with a mean per capita income of between 150 and 500 soles, although there are some
districts which are considerably better off?
The main results of the analysis on geographic targeting are summarized in Figures 5.4
through 5.6. Figure 5.4 presents nonparametric regressions of the predicted per capita
FONCODES expenditures in a district given its mean per capita income in four "typical" years:
1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. The regression lines show that FONCODES expenditures on
education were highest in 1994, and that poorer districts generally received more in per capita
7 All nonparametric  regressions  are Fan regressions,  with a quartic  kernel  (see  Fan, 1992,  and Deaton,
1997).
a There  are (at least)  two  reasons  why allocated  and actual  expenditures  are likely  to differ in practice.
First,  allocations  are an exact figure,  while  FONCODES  projects  are "lumpy"  (for example,  one
classroom),  so that it would  be almost  impossible  for actual  expenditures  to correspond  to allocations  in
any given district. Second,  because  of the demand-driven  nature  of a program  like  FONCODES,  some
districts  may be proactive  and prepare  a large  number  of fundable  projects,  while  others  may not prepare
enough  projects  of an acceptable  technical  quality  to meet their allocations.
9 These  figures  are taken  directly  from a INEI publication  (lNEI, 1996),  and are therefore  in 1995  soles.
8terms than their better-off counterparts, especially after 1992. Moreover, geographic targeting
has clearly improved over time.  By 1996, households living in the wealthiest quartile of districts
were receiving virtually no investments in school facilities from FONCODES at all.
Figure 5.5 presents comparable figures for expenditures made by FONCODES in 1995 in
three sectors: education, electrification, and water and sanitation.  The corresponding curves for
FONCODES projects in other sectors-  community centers, health, agriculture, and
transportation-are  not included to avoid cluttering the pictures, but the results are very similar
for other years and other sectors.  Figure 5.5 suggests that education projects may be somewhat
better targeted to the poorest districts than some of the alternatives in the FONCODES portfolio,
although these differences do not appear to be very large.'0
Figure 5.6, finally, compares district-level expenditures made by FONCODES, the
educational infrastructure program INFES, and the feeding program PRONAA in 1995.  T-he
results show that the geographic distribution of expenditures made by FONCODES was clearly
more pro-poor than that of INFES or PRONAA.  In sum, the geographic targeting of
FONCODES projects in the education sector is progressive, has improved over time, and is
noticeably more pro-poor than that of two other large public sector programs in the sector.
(ii) Household-level targeting: In Peru, there is considerable heterogeneity in the intra-
district distribution of welfare: for example, a simple decomposition of the variance in per capita
income into inter- and intra-district components suggests that only 24% of the variance is
explained by differences across districts.  Reaching poor districts is therefore only a weak proxy
for reaching poor households.  This section looks at the targeting record of FONCODES
investments in education at the household level.
The basic approach we use calculates the household-level incidence of FONCODES
benefits with information from the 1996 INEI survey on per capita income, access to educ;.tional
infrastructure, and access to school breakfast programs financed by FONCODES.  Two (pc ssible)
concerns with this approach are measurement error, and the impact of participation in
FONCODES programs on household income.
In rural areas in Peru, households are likely to have little choice of primary school.  I  n the
absence of measurement error, one would therefore expect a high degree of consistency in I  he
answers given by households within a given rural community about the presence of FONCGI)DES-
10  Note  that it is important  to break  the analysis  down by year,  because  of changes  over  time in both
targeting  performance  and  the composition  of expenditures.  For example,  most FONCODES  projec s in
education  were funded  in the earlier  years,  whereas  most FONCODES  projects  in water and sanitatic  n
were funded  in the later  years. Graphs  of the distribution  of expenditures  by sector  for the entire 1992-
1998  period  would  therefore  (misleadingly)  suggest  that it was easier  to target  water and sanitation  tlan
education  projects.
9funded education projects.  Unfortunately, this is not always the case.  Consider, for example,
households in rural areas who only have children attending primary school.  In 4 rural
communities in the sample, all such households reported that FONCODES had financed
improvements to the local school, and in a further 107 all reported that FONCODES had not
financed improvements. In 46 rural communities, however, there was no agreement, with
different households providing different responses. These results, and similar ones for the
FONCODES school breakfast program, suggest that households in the 1996 INEI survey do not
always report program benefits accurately.  Measurement error of this sort will bias the estimates
of program incidence if it is correlated with income, so that richer (or poorer) households are
more (or less) likely to report that they benefited from FONCODES.
A second problem arises if program participation has an impact on per capita income.
Ideally, to estimate program incidence, one would rank households by the per capita income they
would have had in the absence of the program.  But this income is, by definition, unobservable.
We believe that in the case at hand the impact of program participation on household income is
not a major source of concern because the monetary value to a household of FONCODES
investments in education should only be a small fraction of total household income.  Throughout
the analysis, we simply rank households by their observed per capita income."  As before, we
present nonparametric regressions for educational infrastructure and school breakfast programs.
Figure 5.7 presents a nonparametric univariate density estimate of the distribution of the
log of per capita income. A very small fraction of the population in Peru lives on a (log of) per
capita income of less than 6 soles or more than 10 soles per year.  The graphs for the
nonparametric regressions trim these households at the top and bottom 1% of the income
distribution.
Figure 5.8 compares the household-level incidence of FONCODES investments in school
infrastructure with those made by INFES, and the Parents' Committees (akin to the PTA's  in the
United States). Two things are worth noting about the graph.  First, it shows that the incidence of
investments in educational infrastructure is more pro-poor when these are made by FONCODES
than when they are made by the Parents' Committees or INFES.  The comparison between
FONCODES and INFES is particularly clear. To some extent, no doubt, this reflects the fact that
l In theory,  participation  in an education  program  could increase  or decrease  household  income  in  the short
run. Benefiting  from a free school  breakfast  program  will likely  represent  an increase  in income,  but
putting  children  in school  may lead to a short-term  decrease  in income  if these children  would  otherwise
have been  gainfully  employed.  Note that a similar  problem  with  an unobservable  counter-factual  may  also
arise  with  our estimates  of the incidence  of FONCODES-level  geographic  targeting  for 1992  and 1993.
This is because  the analysis  ranks districts  by mean  district  per capita  income,  but this income  could itself
have  been affected  by FONCODES  investments  made  prior to 1993.
10INFES has (mainly) built or renovated secondary schools in urban areas, while FONCODES has
(mainly) built or renovated primary schools in rural areas. In Peru, as in many other countries,
the poor are less likely to send their children to secondary school and more likely to live in rural
areas.  Second, the nonparametric regressions show that the shape of the FON CODES
distribution slopes upwards at very low levels of (log) per capita income: the poorest 7% of
households are less likely to benefit from FONCODES investments in education infrastructure
than their (slightly) better-off counterparts.
Figure 5.9 compares the household-level incidence of FONCODES'  school breakfa it
program with similar programs executed through PRONAA, the Ministry of Education, andi
municipal governments.  The results suggest that the FONCODES programs tend to be more pro-
poor than those executed by other public sector agencies.  Indeed, the probability of receiving a
school breakfast provided by FONCODES decreases (almost) monotonically with income, and is
highest for children in the lowest quartile of the distribution.  Unlike FONCODES projects to
improve educational infrastructure, the school breakfast program is one of the centrally-
administered "special" projects.  It is therefore much less dependent on the ability of communities
to organize, prepare proposals, liaise with FONCODES officials, and administer funds than the
community-based projects in education.  It may be harder to target community-based projects
than special projects if poor households in poor communities have less institutional capacity.
FONCODES has placed a great deal of importance on geographic targeting, and les5 oil
other forns  of targeting, such as means testing (World Bank, 1996).12  A comparison of the
results on geographic- and household-level targeting suggests that FONCODES has been ni  ore
able to reach poor districts than poor households in these districts.  To explore this issue fuither,
we graph the estimated probability of benefiting from investments made by INFES, PRONAA,
and FONCODES on the number of standard deviations that the income of household i in di ,trict j
is above or below the mean income in district j when both household and district incomes are
calculated from the 1996 INEI survey. Figure 5.10 shows that the nonparametric regressior  lines
for FONCODES school infrastructure and school breakfast programs are "humped", peakir gat
about one standard deviation above mean district income. Within a given district, househo Js that
are somewhat better-off than their counterparts are more likely to benefit from FONCODE',
investments. This suggests that there was essentially no (positive) intra-district targeting o-
FONCODES resources in 1996.
12 The amount  of targetinrg  may be limited  by the nature  of FONCODES  projects,  especially  those which
involve  the construction  of infrastructure.  It may be possible,  however,  to distinguish  between
communities  of different  characteristics  within  a district--in particular  in the larger  districts,  which  also
tend to be less  homogeneous.  Means  testing  may also be possible  for some  of the "special"  projects.
116.  The impact  of FONCODES  investments  in education
Investments in education have long-term effects: higher levels of school attainment are
associated with greater future earnings, lower fertility, better health outcomes both for those who
receive more schooling as well as for their children, and higher levels of educational attainment
for the children of those with more schooling.  FONCODES is much too new for any of these
long-term effects to have appeared. The program is old enough, however, to have had an impact
on rates of school attendance and grade completion of children in Peru.  If FONCODES
investments do not result in more children attending school, staying in school longer, and learning
more while they are there, then the long-term benefits will not materialize.  In this section, we
examine the impact of FONCODES investments on school attendance, the probability of being at
an appropriate grade level for a given age, and the average time it takes children to get to school.
(i) Methods: The simplest way to estimate the impact of FONCODES investments in
education on educational outcomes would be to regress measures of these outcomes on the level
of past program expenditures and a set of controls.  This "naive" regression strategy is likely to
produce biased and inconsistent estimates of the impact if program placement is not random (for
example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986; Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons; Besley and Case;
Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Friedlander and Robbins, 1995). A major reason for bias is the
presence of omitted and often unobserved variables that affect both outcomes and the level of
program benefits.
There are a variety of methods for dealing with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity,
including approaches based on regression discontinuities, different variants of fixed effects
estimators, and instrumental variables (IV) estimators (for a summary, see Meyer, 1995). We use
a number of these techniques to estimate the impact of FONCODES investments.
All of our work is based on a comparison of outcomes of children in districts that received
varying levels of FONCODES funding.  A useful starting point is to specify an equation for an
outcome measure (for example, school attendance) before and after the program has started. Let
YhdO  be an educational outcome for household (or child) h in district d in the "pre-treatment" year
0, and Yhdl  be the same outcome measured in year 1, after the program has begun.  Assume that
the outcome is a function of a set of household and district characteristics Xhd,,  a time dependent
intercept a, and, for the later time period, the amount of per capita FONCODES expenditure
received by the district between year 0 and year  1,  Fd.  The equations for outcomes in the two
years are:
(1) Yhdo  aO  + Xhdo p + ehdO
and
12(2) YhdJ = a,  + Xhd!p  + 5Fd  +  ehdl,
where 6 is the (margyinal)  impact of program expenditure on the outcome.  These two equations
can be more compac.tly  written as follows:
(3) Yhd,  a, + Xhdp  + 
6 Fd l(tl  ) + ehd,,
where I(t-l)  is a indicator function equal to 1 in year 1, and 0 otherwise.
The "naive" approach is to estimate equation (2) by ordinary least squares, using only
data from time period 1. This will produce a consistent estimate of 6 only under the assump Lion
that the expectation of ehdl conditional on Xhd, is zero.  This assumption is suspect, however, both
because FONCODES is targeted to poor areas, and because it is demand-driven.  If poorer
districts, with worse educational outcomes, receive larger levels of Fd, and if poverty is n(:t
adequately controlled for in Xhd,, then it is likely that the estimate of 6 will be biased down.  The
estimate could be negative even if the program actually improves outcomes (see, for exan,  pie, the
results in Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons for Indonesia).  To some extent, this problem can be
countered by including district-level measures in Xhdt, in particular the composite index of unmet
basic needs which FONCODES uses to make allocations.  It is still possible, however, that
decisions to fund projects are based on more accurate information about local conditions,
informnation  that we do not possess.  It is also possible that households in districts that care.  more
about education, or have greater local institutional capacity, are those that organize to apply for
FONCODES funding.  If institutional capacity and "tastes" for education are unobserved and
positively correlated with better educational outcomes, the naive estimate of 6 may be bias,-d up.
If two cross-sections of data are available, one from time 0 and one fiom time  1, n .o re
estimation strategies are possible.  If the same districts and households are represented in l:  o1:h
cross-sections, then a fixed effects estimator is a good alternative.  However, this has an
important disadvantage for our analysis because fixed effects models can be estimated on only a
subset of the data.  The panel of households interviewed in both 1994 and 1997 consists of only
25% of all households interviewed, while the corresponding fraction of households living in
districts which were included in both the 1994 and 1997 LSMS accounts for 71% of the sa:.)nple.
Although the use of district (household) panel data would enable us to handle district (hou.;ehold)
level heterogeneity, it comes at the cost of fewer observations and less precision.
An attractive alternative is to use a "difference-in-difference" estimator.  Assume i lat the
error tern  in (3) takes the special form ehd,=  yFd  +  Shd,.  This is equivalent to a specificatioi  with
district-level fixed effects, with the added restriction that the fixed effects are proportional ;0 the
level of FONCODES funding received.  We then estimate:
13(4)  Yhd, = at  + Xhd P  + yFd + 6Fd I(t= I ) +  l  hdt,
using the full sample of panel and non-panel households. To see how the parameters in
(4) should be interpreted, assume for the moment that funding is either received or not received,
so that Fd  takes on one of two values, 0 or 1. In this case, y measures the difference in the
outcome variable across households in funded and unfunded districts (given Xhd,) in time period
0, prior to the expenditure.  We can therefore refer to it as the "targeting" effect.  The sum of y
and 6 measures the difference across funded and unfunded districts in period 1, after the program
is conducted.  The parameter 8 is the "difference-in-difference", which measures the impact of
FONCODES funding between period 0 and 1. When Fd is a continuous variable, these
parameters represent marginal rather than level differences (see, for example, Angrist and Lavy,
1997, or Duflo for applications of similar methods to the evaluation of education programs).
The difference-in-difference estimate will be biased if there are unobserved factors (such
as poverty, or tastes for education, or local capacity) which have components that vary over time
and are correlated with Fd. For example, the demand for education could change, due to
(unobserved) changes in local labor markets, prompting households in a village to apply for
funding and to keep their children in school longer, with or without the help of FONCODES.  A
solution to this problem is to estimate the model using instrumental variables (IV).  In the case of
FONCODES, the allocation of funds to districts is a good instrument for actual expenditures.
The instrument must meet two well-known conditions: it must be correlated with expenditures,
and uncorrelated with the error term.  The first condition can be tested in practice, while the
second seems plausible since allocations during the years in question were developed from
formulae based on the 1981 and 1993 censuses-both  of which took place before the period
covered in the analysis. It is therefore unlikely that allocations are correlated with unobserved
changes in "tastes" for education between 1994 and 1997.13
Several potential problems with the strategies discussed above should be kept in mind
when assessing our results.  The 1994 LSMS is not a true baseline survey: it was conducted after
FONCODES had made expenditures in 1992 and 1993. In what follows, our measure of
FONCODES expenditure Fd  consists of (per capita) expenditures made in 1994, 1995 and 1996.
We include 1994, since lags between project approval, disbursement of funds, and actual school
13  However,  it is still  possible  that  the allocation  of funds  is correlated  with other  (unobserved)  factors  that
affect  school  attendance.  For example,  it could  be that  other  programs  spend  more or less  money  in
districts  that  have been  allocated  more  by FONCODES,  or that  there are macroeconomic  shocks  that are
correlated  with allocations  and happen  to affect  attendance.  As we discuss  in more  detail  below,  including
controls  for  the amount  spent  by other  programs  on school  infrastructure  does  not alter  our  results. Still,
without  more  years of data,  and more  information  on other  programs,  we cannot  rule out all problems  of
this type.
1  4improvements make it unlikely that 1994 expenditures affected 1994 education outcomes.
Similarly, we exclude 1997 expenditures because these expenditures should not have affected
educational outcomes in 1997. A potential problem is that expenditures made in 1992 and 1993
affected outcomes in both 1994 and 1997, possibly in different ways.  If this is the case, and if
expenditures in 1992 and 1993 are correlated with Fd, our results could be biased.  We do  liot
think this is a large problem. We experimented with defining Fd as expenditures from 1992'  to
1996, and it made little difference to the results that follow.  Separately, we also used the 1991
Peru LSMS to estimate the effect of FONCODES expenditures in 1992 and 1993 on changes in
educational outcomes between 1991 and 1994.  The results (not reported) are quite similar to
those for the 1994-1997 period, although they tend to be more noisy because of the smaller
sample size of the 1991 LSMS.
In all of our results, we do not control for expenditures on other school-based inputs  We
therefore estimate the "gross" effect of FONCODES expenditures on educational outcomes,
inclusive of any "crowding in" or "crowding out" which may occur. For example, if the M:inistry
of Education were more likely to supply teachers to a school renovated by FONCODES, the
effect of these additional teachers would be included in our measure of the impact of
FONCODES investments.  Conversely, if INFES were less likely to invest in school facilities in a
district in which FON  CODES were working, the "net" effect of FONCODES investments may be
larger than the "gross" effect that we estimate.  We believe that this "gross" effect is the
appropriate parameter to estimate for policy purposes: presumably, if FONCODES were to b.
abolished, the resulting effect would be approximated by our results.  Nonetheless, we do riot
think that there are very large differences between the "gross" and "net" estimates of
FONCODES investments.  The Ministry of Education does not have a policy whereby schc ol  s
which receive FONCODES funding receive priority attention for other educational inputs as  well.
We also experimentecl  with including district-level measures of iNFES expenditures in our
regressions.  The results (not reported) are virtually identical to those which follow, sugges zing
that INFES and FON(CODES  investments are orthogonal to each other once appropriate dis  tri  ct-
level controls are included in the model.
Finally, we were unable to use the  1996 INEI survey to construct cluster-level meastires of
FONCODES "treatment" because of the low level of agreement amongst likely FONCODE  S
"beneficiaries" in a given community.  The inability to accurately determine which childrer  ial  a
community have and have not been treated, and the fact that most districts included in the I:iEI
and LSMS surveys received some FONCODES education projects, precludes the use of sta:tistical
matching as an estimation strategy (see, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997; Jalan
and Ravallion, 1998).
15(ii) Results: We start by examining whether districts that received the most FONCODES
expenditure for school improvements achieved the largest gains in school attendance.4 Although
the LSMS surveys can be used to construct measures of district-level attendance, district-level
measures based on larger numbers of children from more districts can also be obtained from the
1993 census and the 1996 INEI survey. While we do not have household-level census data, we
do have information on district-level attendance rates for children aged 6 to I  15
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between school attendance rates and a modified version
of the FONCODES index.  We modify the FONCODES index so that we exclude one variable-
the fraction of children aged 6-11 who are not attending school.6 Keeping this variable in the
FONCODES index would have produced a purely mechanical negative relationship between the
index and school attendance in 1993. Each line in Figure 6.1 corresponds to a nonparametric
regression of the attendance rate on the index in each of the two years, 1993 and 1996. Figure 6.1
shows that the relationship between attendance rates and the FONCODES index ilas changed
during the period.  There is an obvious negative relationship between school attendance and high
levels of unmet basic needs in 1993, but this is no longer apparent in 1996. In other words,
worse-off districts had large gains in school attendance, but better-off districts did not.  Figure 6.2
graphs the change in the school attendance rate and the per capita FONCODES expenditures on
education-both  as a function of the FONCODES index.  This figure shows that the worse-off
districts which experienced greater gains in school attendance also received more funding for
school improvements. The degree of co-movement between attendance gains and school funding
is striking.  It is possible that the relative gains of children in poorer districts were due to some
(unobserved) factor which is coincidentally associated with FONCODES expenditures.  But the
data are also consistent with a causal relationship between expenditures and attendance gains.
14 Throughout  section  6, we consider  only  FONCODES  expenditures  on the construction  and  renovation  of
classrooms  (see  Table 1.1). Specifications  based  on total education  expenditures  do not fit the data quite  as
well,  suggesting  that  the construction  of sports  facilities  and the provision  of educational  material  by
FONCODES  did not have a discernible  impact  on educational  outcomes.
15 The 1993  census  and the 1996  INEI surveys  both ask about  whether  children  in the household  were
attending  school  ("asistiendo  al colegio"),  which  is slightly  different  from the LSMS  question  of whether
children  were attending  school  "or studying  something"  ("asistiendo  al colegio  o estudiando  algo"). One
consequence  of this difference  in the questionnaires  is that school  attendance  rates from  the LSMS  are
somewhat  higher  than for the other  data sources. Note also  that attendance  rates  are unlikely  to be equal  to
enrollment  rates,  as some  children  may be enrolled  but not attending  school.
16 Our  procedure  is to construct,  for each  district,  what the FONCODES  index  would  have  been  had the
district-level  school  attendance  rate  been equal  to the average  over all districts. Essentially,  this means  that
the modified  index  is based  only on the seven  non-attendance  components  of the original.
17 One  puzzling  feature  of Figures  6.1  and 6.2 is that attendance  rates appear  to have  declined  for children
in well-off  districts  between  the earlier  and later  years. However,  this decline  may  be at least  partly  a
feature  of the timing  of the surveys.  In Peru,  the school  year runs from April to December.  The 1993
census  data was collected  in June, relatively  early  in the school  year. The 1996  INEI  was collected  in
November. Attrition of attendance  over  the course  of the school year could account for the lower mean
16We use simple linear regression to further investigate the relationship between changes in
school attendance, the F'ONCODES  index, and FONCODES expenditures.  Table 6.1 shows
results for four regressions.  The change in the district-level school attendance rate is the
dependent variable in all of the specifications.  The independent variables are the FONCODES
index only (row 1), per capita FONCODES expenditures on education only (row 2), both the
index and expenditures (row 3), and per capita expenditures instrumented with the index (row 4).
An identifying assumption of the instrumental variables specification is that initial conditions, as
measured by the modified FONCODES index, affect changes in school attendance only through
their effect on the amount of funding received by a district.
The results in Table 6.1 suggest that changes in school attendance are consistently related
to the FONCODES index: when only the index is included in the regression, a one-standard
deviation increase in the index is associated with a non-trivial increase in the attendance rate of
0.043 points.  Changes in school attendance are also related to differences in per capita
FONCODES expenditures: when only per capita expenditures are included in the regression, a
one-standard deviation increase in expenditures is associated with an increase of 0.043 in the
attendance rate.l1 When both the index and expenditures are included in the regression, the effect
of school expenditure decreases substantially.  This is perhaps not surprising, since the
FONCODES index is the main determninant  of FONCODES expenditures.  Finally, when per
capita expenditure is instrumented with the index, the effect of education expenditures is
significant and very large indeed: a one-standard deviation in expenditure is associated with an
increase in the school attendance rate of 0.141 points.
attendance  rates  in the later  years. Moreover,  if attrition  is negatively  correlated  with  income,  so that
children  in poorer  areas  are more  likely  to drop  out during  the school  year  than their counterparts  in rich:  r
areas, our  estimates  could  underestimate  the effect  of FONCODES  expenditures  on attendance. The
LSMS  surveys  provide  some evidence  that attrition  does affect  measures  of district-level  school  attendani  ce
rates. The 1994  LSMS  was conducted  between  June and August,  and the 1997  LSMS  was conducted
between  September  and  November. In the 1994  LSMS,  there is a drop in attendance  rates of primary-ag  -d
children  of two  percentage  points,  from 96.6%  to 94.6%,  between  June and  July. This decline  is
concentrated  among  children  in districts  with  a higher value  of the FONCODES  index. For example,  for
children  in  districts  with  a value  of the FONCODES  index greater  than 14 (roughly  the median),  the
attendance  rate  declined  from 96%  to 92%. However,  there is no systematic  change  in attendance  rates
across  months  after July in either  the 1994  or 1997  LSMS. Since the 1993  census  was conducted  in June,  a
portion  of the high  rate  of attendance  in 1993  shown  in Figure  6.1 may  reflect  the higher  attendance  durittg
the earlier  part of the school  year. Furthennore,  given that attrition  after June is more likely  for poorer
children,  the results  may  undlerstate  the gains made  by children  in poor districts  relative  to those in rich
districts  between  1993  and 1996. As a double-check  on our results,  we repeated  the analysis  of Figures  (. I
and 6.2  using  the 1994  and 1997  LSMS  surveys,  including  and excluding  observations  from June.
Although  the results  are somewhat  noisier,  since  there are fewer  districts,  we found  that the results  based or
the LSMS  surveys  are similar  to those using  the census and INEI,  and  that excluding  June  has almost  no
effect on the relationship  between  the gain in attendance  and the FONCODES  index.
18 The standard  deviations  of the FONCODES  index and per capita  expenditures  are 7.6  points and 9.7
soles,  respectively.
17These district-level results do not account for changes in school attendance patterns that are
the product of changes in the characteristics of children and their families.  We now turn to
multivariate analysis based on the 1994 and 1997 LSMS to see whether the positive effects of
FONCODES expenditures are still apparent when we control for other factors.
We consider four measures of educational outcomes in the multivariate regressions: the
school attendance rate for children aged 6-13, the school attendance rate for children aged 14-16,
the probability that children aged 8-10 will be at least at the appropriate grade for their age, and
the amount of time (in minutes) it takes children aged 6-13 to get to school1 9 In each case
(except for the measure of school proximity) we run regressions at both the "household" and
"individual" levels. The "individual" regressions take a given child as the unit of observation,
while the "household" regressions take a given household which has at least one child in the
relevant age group as the unit of observation: for example, the first set of individual regressions
estimates the probability that a child aged 6-13 is attending school, while comparable household
regressions estimate the probability that all of the children aged 6-13 in a household are attending
school.  All of the results we present for regressions with dichotomous dependent variables (that
is, those for the probability of attending school or being on track for a given age) are based on the
linear probability model.  The results from probit regressions (not reported) are very similar
throughout.
We start by showing results of "naYve"  regressions in Table 6.2. These specifications
correspond to equation (2) above, when the sample is limited to observations in the 1997 LSMS
(similar regressions were estimated using the 1996 INEI,  with similar results).  The "naYve"
estimates illustrate the problems with drawing inferences from bivariate relationships between
treatments and outcomes based on a single cross-section of data. The coefficients on
FONCODES expenditure when no controls are included (rows 1 and 3) tend to be small and
imprecisely estimated.  Adding a set of controls for household and district-level characteristics
(rows 2 and 4) substantially alters the results.  FONCODES funding becomes positively and
significantly related to school attendance for both younger and older children, although there is
no relationship between spending and the likelihood of being at the right grade level, or spending
and the time it takes to travel to school.
The naive estimates may be badly biased because the targeted and demand-driven nature of
FONCODES projects induces a correlation between the parameter for FONCODES expenditures
and the error tern  in the regression.  We now turn to estimates of the effect of FONCODES
'9  When  testing  the fraction  of children  at appropriate  grades  for their age we limit  the sample  to the
youngest  children  because  of the cumulative  effect  of repetition.
18spending on the change (rather than the level) of education outcomes.  Table 6.3 presents results
from "difference-in-difference" regressions, corresponding to equation (4) above. 20 We report
estimates of y, the coefficient on FONCODES expenditures, and 6, the coefficient on
FONCODES expenditure interacted with a dummy for 1997. The coefficient  v-the  "targeting"
effect-measures  the relationship between the outcome and the amount of FONCODES funding
in 1994. The coefficient o-the  "impact" effect-measures  the change in the outcome between
1994 and 1997 associated with a one-sol increase in FONCODES spending.  Results are shown
for models with no controls; with a set of controls for household and district characteristics; and
instrumental variables estimates with a set of controls 1  FONCODES allocations, as given bv the
allocation rule, are used as an instrument for expenditures.  An identifying assumption of tl is
specification is that the district-level index of unmet basic needs which forms the basis of
FONCODES allocations does not have a direct effect on outcomes other than through its effect
on FONCODES expeiiditures once we have controlled for other district characteristics such as
population, the fraction of children aged 6-11 who were attending school in 1993, and income.
The results provide evidence of a significant and sizeable impact of FONCODES
expenditures on school attendance for all younger children in a household (top panel).
Households in districts which received more FONCODES funding were initially less likely to
send all their primary-aged children to school (the coefficient on y is generally negative), but
experienced greater increases in the likelihood that all children attended school than did
households in districts which received less funding (the coefficient on 6 is positive and
significant).  The size Df the estimated effect on school attendance is largest in the instrumeiital
variables specifications: a one-standard deviation (5.2 sol) increase in per capita expendituri.s
made by FONCODES on educational infrastructure is associated with an increase in the
probability that all children in a household attend school of 0.09.  Considering that median ]:,er
capita consumption in Peru was about 564 soles in 1997, this is a very large effect indeed. 22 Tile
results for individual school attendance, in the bottom panel, are smaller and less precisely
20  We also  calculated  results  based  on specifications  with  district  and household-level  fixed  effects. T  he
estimates  based  on district-level  fixed  effects  specifications  are very  similar  to the results  from the
differences-in-differences  specifications,  although  they  tend to be more  noisy. The results  which incLAmd
household-level  fixed  efficts are all, essentially,  equal  to zero. This  may not be surprising  given the very
small  sample  sizes:  for example,  there  are only  376  households  which  were in the household  panel  an:[  L ad
primary-aged  children  in both 1994  and 1997.
21 Note that the sum of the impact  and  targeting  effects in the equations  with no controls  in Table  6.3 .s
(and  must be) identical  to the corresponding  estimates  of the impact  effect from  the "naive" estimates  in
Table  6.2.  This highlights  that  the naive  estimates  do not properly  account  for the fact  that districts  whici
received  more  FONCODE]S  funding  had poorer  initial  educational  outcomes.
22 Here,  too, both  household  consumption  and FONCODES  expenditures  are reported  inl992 soles.
19estimated.  The IV estimates indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in per capita
expenditures increases the probability that a child attends school by 0.05.
There is less evidence of an impact of FONCODES on the school attendance of older
children.  Although the OLS estimates suggest that districts which received more FONCODES
funding had greater gains in attendance for older children, this effect disappears when
expenditures are instrumented with allocations.  In other words, districts with higher allocations
did not experience greater gains in school attendance of older children.  A likely interpretation of
this finding is that districts that chose to apply for school funds had characteristics, such as an
increase in the return to education or a shift in preferences toward education, which also resulted
in higher school attendance among older children.
FONCODES funding does not appear to have helped children stay at grade levels that are
"'appropriate" given their ages.  This result may not be surprising: a program that increases school
attendance may pull in older children who were not previously in school, or children who are less
able to progress at the "expected" rate.  Our measure of the "impact" of FONCODES
expenditures mixes together the progress of children who would have been in school in the
absence of FONCODES with the progress of children who wou'ld  not have attended without
FONCODES, and so does not provide a clean measure of (possible) increases in school quality.23
There is also no strong evidence that FONCODES funding has reduced the time that children take
to get to school. This may not be surprising, given that FONCODES expenditures were generally
used to upgrade existing schools rather than to build new schools.
7.  Conclusion
This paper analyzes the targeting and impact of FONCODES projects in the education
sector.  We use nonparametric regressions to evaluate the geographic and household incidence of
FONCODES investments. Our findings show that FONCODES reached poor districts and, to the
extent that they live in these districts, poor households.  The targeting of FONCODES projects in
education has improved over time, and compares favorably with the targeting of other public
sector programmes.
In the second part of the paper, we use various estimation strategies to analyze the impact
of FONCODES on school attendance rates, the probability that children are at the right school
level for their age, and travelling time to school.  We show that households in districts which
received more FONCODES education expenditures had bigger gains in school attendance for
23 For a similar  argument about the impact of a de-worming program on educational outcomes in Kenya,
see Miguel and Kremer (1999).
20young children.  There is no evidence that FONCODES affected the probability of being at the
right school level, and only weak evidence that it decreased the average time it takes children to
get to school.
There are large differences between the estimates of impact from "naYve"  regressions based
on a single cross-section of data and those which are based on repeated cross-sections. We argue
that the "nalve" regressions are likely to be badly biased because of the targeted and deman1d-
driven nature of a program like FONCODES.  Estimates of impact which focus on changes in
outcomes are likely to produce more accurate results, although it may still be necessary to use
instrumental variables to correct for unobserved changes in district-level conditions.
The results in this paper suggest that investments in school facilities in Peru had positive
effects on some educational outcomes.  They thus add to a growing literature which finds
evidence of a positive association between school-based inputs and measures of educational
attainment (for example, Glewwe and Jacoby, Krueger, 1999; Angrist and Lavy, 1999, Case and
Deaton). Nonetheless, the analysis in this paper was constrained by important limitations ol the
data.  We would like to touch on three areas which deserve attention.  First, at no point has
FONCODES randomly assigned funds for education projects.  As a result, various econometric
strategies have to be ernployed in an attempt to mimic a quasi-experimental setting.  Like the
Bolivian Social Fund, IFONCODES  could consider some random assignment of education
projects for a sub-sample of the population as a way of testing the robustness of the assumpt;.ons
and results presented in this paper (see Newman, 1998).  Second, given the absence of credible
village-level measures of FONCODES funding, all of our estimates of the impact of educati.:n
projects are based on district-level measures of FONCODES expenditures.  Further
disaggregation could be important, especially in urban districts, which can be very large. Vi lage-
level measures of "treal:ment' would also make it possible to use statistical matching as an
estimation strategy. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, lack of disaggregated informatic ri on
measures such as the time children spend in school, pupil-teacher ratios, and scholastic
achievement, precluded any analysis of the impact of FONCODES education projects on schocl
quality.  Collecting such data, and understanding the mechanisms whereby improvements in
school infrastructure in Peru interact with other school-level changes to result in more learnin  g,
should be an important priority for further research.
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24Table 1.1: Total FONCODES expenditures and FONCODES expenditures on education
projects, by year
Year  Total expenditures  Construction and renovation of  Other  education
classrooms
number  amount  number  amount  %  number  amount
1992  2813  102.7  1185  26.2  25.5  386  6.9  6.7
1993  5238  144.9  2327  49.4  34.1  430  5.8  4.0
1994  4551  110.4  2380  48.7  44.1  100  1.3  1.2
1995  3056  79.3  1037  24.7  31.1  42  0.7  0.9
1996  4222  83.4  987  15.0  18.0  14  0.3  04
1997  5807  114.8  607  11.0  9.6  9  0,2  0.2
1998  6088  123.8  636  12.0  9.7  1  0.0  0.0
TOTAL  31775  759.2  9160  187.1  24.6  981  15.3  2.0
Note: Only expenditures on community-based subprojects are included.
Number refers to the number of projects, amount to the amount disbursed, in 1992 soles, and % to the
percentage of education expenditures as a fraction of total expenditures.
25Figure 5.1: Average years of school attained  by age, for children  in poorest 25% of districts
to richest 25% of districts
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26Figure  5.3: Estimated  density function  of the population  living in districts  with different
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Figure  5.4: Geographic  targeting  of FONCODES  education  projects,  various  years
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28Figure  5.7: Estimated  density function  of the log of per capita  income, Peru,  1996
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F igure 5.8: Householal-level targeting  of FONCODES,  INFES, and the Parents'  Commiittees
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29Figure  5.9: Household-level targeting  of FONCODES,  PRONAA,  Ministry  of Education
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Figure  5.10: Probability  of benefiting from social programs,  by the number  of standard
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30Figure  6.1: Nonparametric  regressions  of district  school attendance  rate  on the (modified)
FONCODES  index
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Figure  6.2: Non-parametric  regressions  of the change in district-level  school attendanc e :nd
FONCODES per  capita education  expenditure  on the (modified) FONCODES  indcx
I  I  I  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~I  I  !  I 
.1 - t15
a)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a
.°t  05  Change in school
c  attendance rate  /r
o  ~  ~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~  1  /e  |t
(U  x~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U
.:  ~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~~~5  LL
5  D05  0i
C  <  ~~~~~~~Per  capita  FONCODES  3
Q |  </  ~~~~~~~expenditure  T,
o  5  t 0  15  20  25  30  35
FONCODES  index
31Table 6.1: Impact of FONCODES investments on school attendance rates, district-level data
FONCODES  index  Per  capita  education  expenditure










Note: The FONCODES  index  has been  purged  of the component  that  measures  school  attendance  in 1993.
This  was done  by calculating  what the FONCODES  index  would  have  been for each district  had it had a
school  attendance  rate equal  to the mean  across  districts. School  infrastructure  expenditure  is per capita
expenditure  by FONCODES  on school  infrastructure  between  1992  and 1995. Absolute  t-statistics  based
on heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  are reported  in parentheses.  In the instrumental  variables
regression  per capita  FONCODES  expenditures  on education  is instrumented  with  the FONCODES  index.
The t-statistic  on the instrument  in  the first stage  of the IV equation  was significant  at better  than  the 1%
level.
32Table 6.2: "NaYve"  regression estimates of the impact of FONCODES investments in
education
School  School  At right  school  Time to sc  hool,
attendance,  attendance,  year,  children  8-  children  6-13
children  6-13  children  14-16  10
HOUSEHOLD
OLS (no controls)  .0001  -.0002  -.0042  -.1755
(0.19)  (0.10)  (1.37)  (2.21)
OLS (all controls)  .0012  .0039  -0006  -.0650
(2.01)  (2.23)  (0.21)  (1.04)
Number  2126  1074  1211  2054
INDIVIDUAL
OLS (no controls)  .0001  -.0003  -.0043
(0.28)  (0.14)  (1.56)
OLS (all controls)  .0007  .0032  -.0012
(1.55)  (1.86)  (0.45)
Number  3792  1262  1443
Note: Absolute t-statistics are reported in parenthesis, and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors corrected for clustering at the district level.  The estimates with "no controls" include c:nly
one independent variable, FONCODES per capita expenditure on the construction or renovation of
classrooms. The estimates with controls also include education of the household head, household size. thte
numbers of males and females in ten age categories, a dummy variable for whether the household live  ini  a
rural area, a dummy variable for ethnicity of household head (indigenous or non-indigenous), twenty-f mur
departmental dummy variables, a district-level measure of the FONCODES index of unmet basic neec:  s,
mean district per capita income, and district population.  In addition, the individual-level regressions
include dummy variables for the exact age of the child.  The dependent variables for school attendance ar
the household level equal one if all children in the relevant age range are in school, and zero otherwise
These regressions include only households with children in the relevant age range.  The household me..sure
of whether children are at the right grade level for their age is defined similarly.  The individual-level
school attendance and grade-level variables equal one if the child is attending school (or at the right gr Lde
level), and zero otherwise.
33Table 6.3: "Difference in difference" regression estimates of the targeting and impact effects
of FONCODES investments in education
School  School  At right  school  Time  to school,
attendance,  attendance,  year,  children  8-  children  6-13
children  6-13  children  14-16  10
Y  6  6  y  6  y  6
HOUSEHOLD
OLS (no controls)  -.0066  .0067  -.0156  .0154  -.0096  .0054  -.1038  -. 0717
(3.60)  (3.52)  (3.01)  (2.82)  (2.97)  (1.28)  (0.92)  (0.54)
OLS (all controls)  -.0026  .0040  -.0028  .0056  -.0001  -.0015  -.1363  -.0544
(2.04)  (3.01)  (0.79)  (1.43)  (0.03)  (0.33)  (1.35)  (0.44)
IV (all controls)  -. 0167  .0178  .0146  -. 0041  .0200  -.0061  .9744  -1.181
(1.32)  (2.43)  (0.49)  (0.29)  (0.79)  (0.44)  (1.03)  (1.92)
Number  4127  2144  2293  3987
INDIVIDUAL
OLS (no controls)  -.0026  .0027  -.0133  .0130  -.0085  .0042
(2.85)  (2.70)  (3.03)  (2.81)  (3.03)  (1.11)
OLS (all controls)  -.0006  .0015  -.0022  .0042  .0002  -.0020
(0.68)  (1.42)  (0.71)  (1.25)  (0.06)  (0.54)
IV (all controls)  -.0093  .0090  .0117  -.0074  .0264  -.0045
(1.09)  (1.95)  (0.45)  (0.60)  (0.99)  (0.33)
Number  7380  2507  2746
Notes: See notes to Table 6.2 for variable definitions and a list of controls.  In the IV regressions, per capita
FONCODES expenditures and its interaction with the year dummy are instrumented with per capita
FONCODES allocations and its interaction with the year dummy.  The FONCODES index of unmet basic
needs is excluded from the IV regressions because it is highly correlated with FONCODES allocations, but
other district-level measures, including mean district per capita income, the fraction of 6-11  -year olds
attending school, and district population are included as controls.  The instruments in the first stage of the
IV equations are jointly significant the 5% level or better in all of the samples.
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